On 7 October 2026, The Guardian published an article titled Scientists who put faith in technology are less likely to take climate action. The article reported on a study by the London School of Economics, which surveyed more than 9,000 scientists across 115 countries about their views on whether technology will largely solve the problems caused by climate change. The findings suggested that scientists expressing greater faith in technological solutions were less likely to engage in civic action or make significant changes to their own lifestyles.
I was invited to comment on the study, although I had no involvement in the research itself. My comments prompted a range of responses, both critical and supportive (many of the latter made privately). Among the critical responses was a considered contribution on LinkedIn that raised several arguments frequently advanced in support of a predominantly technological approach to climate mitigation. These included the limited historical evidence for deliberate, large-scale social and behavioural transformations; the different standards of proof often applied to technological and societal solutions; and the risks of presenting technological progress and demand-side measures as competing approaches. A question was also raised asking whether prioritising lifestyle changes over technological progress may in fact undermine democratic support for climate action, ultimately resulting in less mitigation rather than more.
These arguments deserve serious consideration. But they also raise more fundamental questions about what is required to meet the commitments of the Paris Agreement, and whether the prevailing emphasis on technological solutions adequately addresses those requirements. Drawing on these recent exchanges and similar arguments I have encountered over many years, this article examines three closely related issues: the time available to deliver the necessary emissions reductions, the equitable distribution of the changes required, and the historical evidence for societies undertaking profound economic and social transformations.
My central argument is that, while rapid and large-scale technological deployment is indispensable, it is now far from sufficient. The remaining carbon budget leaves no room for an approach that relies predominantly on technological progress while deferring the necessary reductions in energy and resource consumption. To do so is not simply to underestimate the scale of the challenge; it is, in practice, to abandon the temperature and equity commitments of the Paris Agreement.
The case for technological optimism
A recurring argument in discussions about climate mitigation is that large-scale social and behavioural transformations are themselves largely unproven. The claim is that few countries have deliberately adopted degrowth or sufficiency-based approaches as national economic strategies, and that historical examples of profound changes in consumption and economic activity have generally been associated with temporary economic disruption, political upheaval or external constraints.
By contrast, technologies such as solar power demonstrate that solutions once considered marginal or commercially unproven can become viable and deployed at scale. Requiring emerging technologies to demonstrate a history of deployment at planetary scale before accepting their potential would risk creating a circular argument: technologies remain unproven until they have already been deployed at scale.
There is also a legitimate concern that presenting lifestyle change as the primary response to climate change, or setting it against technological progress, could undermine public support for mitigation. Demand-side measures, on this argument, should complement technological development rather than replace it.
There is much in these arguments that deserves serious consideration. Technological and demand-side approaches should not be presented as mutually exclusive, and we should be wary of assuming that far-reaching social transformations will simply follow once faith in technological solutions has been challenged. Nor should we underestimate either the political difficulties of securing public support for significant changes in consumption and established practices, or the considerable resources and political influence of those with an interest in perpetuating a predominantly technology-based narrative.
However, I think these arguments, and technological optimism more generally, fail to give sufficient consideration to two fundamental constraints on what is now required to meet the commitments of the Paris Agreement: time and equity.
Time and fairness
The starting point for my framing of climate change is the spirit and the letter of the UNFCCC, together with the subsequent temperature and equity commitments enshrined in the Paris Agreement. Follow these through and, with a few twists and turns, you arrive at the remaining carbon budgets. More accurately, you arrive at a stark reality: there is no longer sufficient carbon budget remaining for the deployment of low-carbon technologies alone to get anywhere near meeting the Paris commitments.
Yes, a ‘Marshall Plan on speed’ for the deployment of low-carbon technologies is an absolute prerequisite. And here, demand-side technologies are every bit as important as the supply-side technologies that tend to dominate discussions about technological solutions. But even an unprecedented acceleration in technological deployment is now far from sufficient.
To have any prospect of remaining within even the weaker 2°C framing of Paris, global emissions need to fall at rates well in excess of those achieved during the peak of the Covid pandemic, and to sustain those reductions year after year. The timeframe imposed by the remaining carbon budgets means that deep and rapid emissions reductions through changes in behaviour, consumption and social norms are also a prerequisite. Without them, we fail to meet Paris.
This is the time constraint that the promise of future technologies, particularly those that remain unproven at the necessary scale, so readily obscures.
The second fundamental issue is equity. Discussions about changes in behaviour, norms and practices are too often framed as though they apply equally to everyone. They plainly do not. Most people are below-average emitters and have below-average incomes. Many are also, to a very large extent, locked into the existing high-carbon physical infrastructure. Yet a disproportionate share of emissions and discretionary consumption sits elsewhere: with those of us whose incomes and lifestyles embed highly discretionary emissions, and whose consumption patterns and practices could be changed significantly through meaningful and stringent regulation.
There is a tendency, particularly among wealthier and higher-emitting groups, to present climate action as though we are all equally implicated and equally required to change. In doing so, concern for the circumstances of poorer households can become a convenient justification for avoiding scrutiny of our own carbon- and resource-intensive lifestyles.
The four- to five-fold difference in energy consumption between wealthier and less wealthy households in the UK illustrates the point. There is simply no energy crisis for many of us. The energy insecurity experienced by average and lower income households is driven not only by Putin, Trump or Khamenei, but also by the extraordinarily high levels of energy consumption among wealthier households. While some of us continue to fly frequently, drive SUVs and heat second homes, others are literally choosing between food and heat.
A fair approach to mitigation must start by recognising these differences, rather than treating reductions in consumption as an equivalent burden for everyone. It is not a question of imposing austerity on those who already have little, but of addressing the disproportionately high and often highly discretionary consumption of those with the greatest capacity to change.
Supply promises – too little too late
In the discussion around the article, solar was given as an example of a technology that, in 2000, was considered relatively unproven but has since achieved substantial commercial deployment. This illustrates, to me, how the emergency framing of the problem is being missed.
In 2000, solar accounted for less than 0.1% of global electricity generation. Today, it is a substantial and rapidly growing source of electricity. This is an important technological achievement. But we do not have another 26 years to see which technologies mature and scale.
Since 2000, we have emitted almost a trillion tonnes of CO₂. The mitigation challenge we face today is therefore fundamentally different from the one we faced then.
The issue is not whether technologies such as solar can eventually scale, clearly, some can and do. Nor is it whether further technological advances will make important contributions to mitigation. The issue is whether sufficient technologies can be deployed rapidly enough, alongside sufficiently deep demand-side reductions, to stay within the remaining carbon budget.
There is also a fundamental difference between electricity generation and the wider energy system. In 2025, global solar generated approximately 2,800 TWh of electricity, equivalent to just over 2.2% of global final energy demand of around 125,000 TWh. On the same basis, solar accounted for around 1.4% of UK final energy consumption, with onshore and offshore wind combined accounting for almost 6%.
These comparisons are not intended to undervalue solar, or any other renewable technology, but to provide some necessary quantitative context. The climate does not distinguish between CO₂ emissions from electricity generation and those arising from energy use more widely. What matters is the speed and scale at which emissions are reduced across the entire energy system.
Assessing the contribution of low-carbon technologies therefore requires looking beyond electricity generation alone, and considering both their deployment rates and the emissions reductions they actually deliver across the wider energy system. Crucially, those reductions must be assessed against Paris-aligned carbon budgets and the extraordinarily tight timelines these now impose.
The consequences of assuming we will fail
I read some of the arguments for technological optimism as resting on an implicit assumption that we are going to fail to meet even the 2°C interpretation of Paris. The suggestion seems to be that this failure may be less consequential because the climate impacts of 2-3°C of warming are unlikely to be sufficiently severe to trigger rapid and profound changes in social norms.
Here I disagree, based on my understanding of the impacts literature and, increasingly, the research on tipping points. Such levels of warming are very likely to impose profound and rapid social change. But this is unlikely to take the form of some coordinated, progressive transformation in response to a shared understanding of the climate emergency. Rather, it risks being characterised by increasingly reactive, destabilising and potentially violent responses to an increasingly unstable climate.
If the assumption is that even at 2-3°C of warming, climate impacts will not be sufficiently severe to trigger profound social change, then I think it needs to be made explicit. This matters because it would underpin an argument for continuing to rely predominantly on technological solutions, even where there is a significant risk that they will not deliver the necessary emissions reductions within the available timeframe. In effect, this amounts to accepting the risk of failing to meet Paris, on the assumption that the resulting climate impacts could be readily manageable.
Historical evidence of social transformation
There is a further problem with the suggestion that large-scale social and behavioural transformations are unproven. It is true that relatively few countries have explicitly adopted degrowth or sufficiency as national economic strategies. But this is a rather narrow interpretation of history.
Britain provides an obvious counterexample. During the Second World War, and for a decade afterwards, successive governments maintained extensive controls over consumption, production, imports and the allocation of resources. Food rationing continued until 1954, with the final restrictions removed in 1955. These were not simply spontaneous responses to shortages: they were deliberate policies, justified in part through the equitable distribution of scarce resources and the wider priorities of economic reconstruction.
There are numerous other examples. The 1973 oil crisis prompted governments across Europe to introduce restrictions on private motoring, petrol consumption and energy use. The post-war reconstruction of European economies also involved extensive government direction of investment, materials, wages and consumption.
The financial crisis of 2007–09 provides a more recent and particularly relevant example. In the UK, and across much of Europe and the US, the subsequent period has been characterised by prolonged stagnation in living standards, constrained public services and significant pressures on household security. This was not simply an unavoidable consequence of the financial crisis. Successive government policy choices, including those on taxation, public spending, social security and housing, have helped determine how the limited economic gains have been distributed.
These policies have not necessarily been presented as deliberately restricting the wellbeing of particular sections of society. But their cumulative effects have been very real. Many households have experienced little improvement, and in some respects a deterioration, in their material and social wellbeing, while those already possessing substantial housing and financial assets have generally been much better placed to protect and build their wealth.
The consequences are particularly apparent between generations. The expectation that children would enjoy greater material security and opportunities than their parents has increasingly broken down. For many younger people, access to secure housing, wealth accumulation and the economic opportunities previously available to their parents has become considerably more difficult.
This is an important distinction. Societies do not simply experience economic change; political choices shape how its costs and benefits are distributed. The post-2008 experience demonstrates that governments can oversee prolonged constraints on the material wellbeing of very substantial sections of society, even while the economy continues to grow. The question is not whether such changes are possible, but whose wellbeing is protected, whose is sacrificed and who gets to make those decisions.
None of these examples represents a straightforward blueprint for a fair, Paris-aligned transition. Some were imposed by war or economic crisis, and others involved deeply unequal distributions of hardship. But that is precisely the point: societies can undergo profound changes in economic activity, consumption and social practices. The important questions are how those changes are brought about, who benefits, who bears the costs and whether they improve or undermine wider social wellbeing.
The absence of numerous historical examples of countries explicitly adopting degrowth is therefore not evidence that large-scale social transformation is impractical. Nor does it justify assuming that technological progress alone can deliver the emissions reductions required within the remaining carbon budget. Indeed, the historical record demonstrates that governments and societies have repeatedly undertaken profound economic and social transformations when confronted with circumstances they regard as sufficiently serious.
Some closing thoughts
Ultimately, this is not a choice between technology and behaviour, or between supply-side and demand-side mitigation. Both are essential. The question is whether we are prepared to confront the scale, speed and distribution of the changes demanded by the remaining carbon budget, rather than rely on the promise that future technologies will somehow buy us more time.
The Paris Agreement is not a commitment to pursue technological progress or incremental improvements in efficiency. It is a commitment to limit global heating, with equity at its heart.
More than a third of a century has passed since the UNFCCC was established, during which around 1.3 trillion tonnes of CO₂ have been emitted. More than a decade has also passed since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, yet, with the brief exception of the Covid pandemic, global emissions have continued to rise. The passage of time and the emissions accumulated in the intervening years have fundamentally changed the nature of the mitigation challenge. What might once have been achievable through the progressive development and deployment of low-carbon technologies can no longer be delivered through technological progress alone. The remaining carbon budget imposes radically different physical constraints, requiring much deeper and more immediate emissions reductions across the entire energy system. Technology-oriented narratives that might have been broadly credible in 2000, and perhaps even when the Paris Agreement was adopted, are now deeply inadequate and highly misleading. The challenge is no longer simply to develop and deploy low-carbon technologies at scale, but to achieve the unprecedented speed and depth of emissions reductions that the remaining carbon budget demands.
Rapid and large-scale technological deployment remains indispensable, but it must be accompanied by substantial reductions and redirections in energy and resource consumption. These reductions need to be particularly deep among wealthier, higher-emitting groups, whose discretionary consumption accounts for a disproportionate share of emissions.
A mitigation strategy that relies predominantly on technological responses while avoiding the necessary reductions in consumption is incompatible with the temperature and equity commitments of the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement. It also falls short of the strengthened mitigation expectations of the Glasgow Climate Pact and Belém Political Package, and the obligations and principles reinforced by the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on climate change.
The issue, then, is not whether technology has a central role in climate mitigation; it unquestionably does. It is whether technological progress can credibly be presented as a substitute for the scale, speed and distribution of emissions reductions now required across the whole economy. It cannot.
To invoke the Paris Agreement while advancing a mitigation strategy incapable of delivering it is to abandon the agreement in practice while continuing to endorse it in principle.